A b stra c t: The article examines how far the transformation process in the post-socialist countries can be consid ered an "ongoing" modernization in Parsons' sense. The starting point of the investigation is a comparison of cur rent developments in Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics focusing on the effects of market and political pluralization on the level of social structure, everyday patterns of action and the changes undergone by eli tes. Finally, the special case of the former GDR is discussed. Because of anomic effects occurring in the transition process and causing social and ethnic exclusion, disintegration and particularization, the article questions a precipi tate evaluation of the transformation process as a positive institutional modernization.
The Problem
When it comes to assessing the transformation pro cess in post-socialist countries, a perspective which has been gaining prominence within German soci ology is known as the theory of institutional or "ongoing" modernization (Zapf 1991: 46) . This approach supposes that the social structure in post socialist countries (particularly the former GDR) has collapsed, but sees that as a potential opportu nity for successful modernization in the countries concerned (Zapf: 1991a (Zapf: , 1993 . According to the theory, it is the advent of modernizing institutions in the decomposed societies of real socialism -as manifested in the implementation of political plu ralism, i.e. competitive democracy, the rule of law, a market economy and the welfare state accompa nied by mass consumption -which sets in motion the structural mechanisms of modern social inte gration. Following on from Parsons (1972: 20) , the mechanisms identified in this respect, which entail inherent social conflict alongside their integrative effect, consist of social inclusion, value generaliza tion, differentiation and adaptive (status) upgrad ing. These mechanisms are supposedly the driving forces of "'ongoing modernization' in the dual sense of directional constancy and structural im provement" (Zapf 1991: 46) .1 2 1 This paper is based on a study of the "Collapse of Real Socialism" which has been published as a course text for the Open University of Hagen. Cf. Bertels 1993. The present version has been translated by Neil Johnston. 2 The key passage here (in unofficial translation) re ads: "In my view, a modernization theory 'hardened' by conflict theory and innovation theory is the most suitable approach for gaining an understanding of I would like to subject this concept to some scruti ny in this paper. My purpose here is not to criticize the upheavals in the east as well as the current prob lems and future opportunities in the west. Competi tive democracy, the market economy and an affluent society with a welfare state and mass consumption are the basic institutions within which the struggle to innovate takes place. The degree of political central ism and the extent of regional disparities, of ethnic/ religious conflicts, of elements of concordance de mocracy, of class polarization, of the welfare state and of social attachment in the market economy all -in addition to the international position of the soci ety concerned -make up the dimensions of varia tion in modern societies. Inclusion, value generaliza tion, differentiation and adaptive upgrading are the mechanisms of social change. I call this process "on going modernization", in the dual sense of direction al constancy and structural improvement." (Zapf 1991: 46) . Zapf certainly recognizes a number of "significant ar guments" against the model as presented, and also the existence of "countless phenomena of exclusion, fault-lines, erosion and large-scale risks". Neverthe less, he sees " ... no sufficient empirical or theoreti cal reasons to doubt the innovative capacity of the basic institutions of modern societies" (Zapf 1991: 48) . Even though he explicitly points out " ...
[the] examination of successful innovations, failed innova tion attempts and the transferability of modern insti tutions" (Zapf 1991: 49) , his line of argument (aimed mainly against the criticism of the transition in the east voiced by "western Marxists" and taking up an incisive counter-position) nonetheless leaves no room for doubt that, in his opinion, there are " ... at present no more effective alternatives [in sight to] competitive democracy, the market economy and an affluent society with a welfare state and mass con sumption ... now that socialism is out of the running for the foreseeable future." (Zapf 1991: 47) .
the above modernization theory in and of itself, as it undoubtedly has a good deal of plausibility with in the particular sphere of social reality from which it is derived, i.e. the social reality of western indus trial nations and of their historical development. Nor do I seek to deny that the institutional struc ture of western industrial societies provides a benchmark for the transformation processes in post-socialist countries, even if it does tend to vary in its concrete form. Rather, the question I would like to pursue is whether the modernization mech anisms postulated by the theory really do operate in post-socialist reality with the "directional con stancy" and "structural improvements" they are evidently assumed to entail. The immediate theoretical doubt I wish to raise is that a theory of "ongoing modernization" which is ultimately a theory of change, or in other words one which deals with dynamic processes, is being applied here in a manner which does not pay sufficiently close attention to the time factor in the very developments it is attempting to ex plain. It is not enough for consideration of the temporal dimension of transformation to be con fined to naming the period of time within which successful adjustment is likely to be achieved. If one considers the prospect of a collapsed social structure into which institutions are to be im planted in order to provide new structures, it is virtually self-evident that a certain period of time will need to elapse before the new institutions can begin to take hold. And when they do "take hold" the idea that this will give rise to changes in action in the manner intended by the newly implemented institutions is only one, i.e. the most optimistic, of the conceivable scenarios. As Robert Merton ([1949] 1968: 230 ff.) has already shown, there are a number of other possible courses developments might take when people adjust to a situation they perceive as anomic. These are the familiar alternatives of withdrawal, ritualism, rebellion and innovation; the latter of these, if it involves the pursuit of system immanent objectives using means which do not conform to the system, may well include crime (also including criminal behaviour in govern ment and business), corruption, etc. In theoretical terms, then, we should not necessar ily assume a linear time chart depicting a steady in crease in the intended effect of the modernization institutions once implemented; rather, one should assume that the collapse of the social structure in which the institutions are expected to operate will first cause an anomic rift in the linear development imagined in the ideal-typical conception,3 or in other words that the imaginary line on the graph will begin by falling away and will not rise again, if at all, for some time. Hence even in the best con ceivable adjustment scenario we ought to be deal ing with a U-curve effect. However, because we need to regard the course of development as an open-ended process, the inevitable conclusion is that whatever happens in the post-socialist coun tries during this U-curve period can be expected to have a substantial influence on the trend followed by the transformation process. In order to make better assessment of such pro cesses, we need to be aware of what the successful operation of institutions -i.e. operation which generates their intended effects-depends upon.
Institutions operate within a social environment; they not only exert influences upon that environ ment but are in turn influenced by it. Thus the ef fectiveness of institutions also depends upon the everyday action orientations and expectation structures of the actors which constitute that envi ronment or, to use Parsons' terms, upon the accep tance of their goals within the system of values and upon the reproduction or modification of those goals within the system of interaction of a particu lar society. If we wish to clarify what happens during the Ucurve of the transformation process and to assess the shape of that curve for the transformation pro cess itself, we have to view the effect of the imple mented institutions in the context of the social structure of the post-socialist countries, and have to examine the "interaction" of this effect with the semantic inventory of the societies concerned.4
The implication of this is that we must turn our at tention to the meaning level of the transformation process, i.e. to the expectation structures in every day action referred to above, which determine both the attitude taken to the process and the ori entation of action within it.
3 There would appear to be a considerable amount of scepticism in the central and eastern European per spective with regard to such ideas of linear develop ment and the associated optimistic view of modern ization (Stojanov 1992) . Others to have voiced their doubts on this include Kabele 1992 and Musil 1992. 4 That the course taken by the transformation process is determined by this "interaction" is especially and repeatedly emphasized by analyses made from the perspective of the affected countries themselves (Sztompka 1993 , Musil 1992 , Kabele 1992 , Brokl 1992 ).
There are two fundamental paradoxes5 underlying and characterizing the transformation process which this assessment will focus upon: a) The political and economic institutions of bour geois, civil society {bürgerliche Gesellschaft) need in this case to be introduced by a plan imposed from above. In other words, they cannot rely on support from any social structure which has grown organically and is complementary to them -quite the opposite: b) Not only the mechanisms of social organization and the habitualized and institutionalized action orientations available for a process intended to es tablish true citizenship in post-socialist societies, but also the vast bulk of economic and administra tive potential are in fact products of the real social ism which is supposedly being superseded. To sum up, whatever ingredients may be used by particu lar restructuring recipes, they will still ultimately have to be cooked in the oil or water laid on by real socialism.
The above material paradoxes leave no other choice but to accept a similarly paradoxical scheme of assessment. The upheavals in the social struc ture in real socialism and the implementation of new institutions have to be viewed against a back ground in which elements of the real socialist stock of knowledge continue to exert a certain validity and continue to be applied (Srubar 1991) . On the one hand, the implementation of a market econo my and political pluralism results in the structure of society being turned in on itself; this process, moreover, occurs simultaneously on all fundamen tal levels, for political and economic restructuring goes hand-in-hand with a deep-seated insecurity in the action orientations of those involved in it. When regarded in structural terms, the effects of these changes create a burst of anomie manifesting itself in the collapse of the economy, of political power and of social integration.6 * Yet on the other hand, the means of coping with this anomic situa tion continue to be shaped by actors resorting to the orientations of real socialism, which thus con tinue to operate on the meaning level during the transformation process. It is this level of everyday action in particular which lends social action at least the appearance of normality, thus partly con 5 For a thorough treatment of the countless paradoxi cal implications of post-socialist transformation, see Offe 1991. 6 Enquiries conducted by Czech and Hungarian au thors speak of "transformation anomie" (Kabele 1992 , Andorka 1992 ).
cealing the structural ruins, but partly building new bridges (Kabele 1992) . Taking this state of affairs as the point of depar ture, I should like to proceed in two stages. First ly, I shall examine the effect on social structure in the post-socialist countries of privatization in the economic sphere and pluralization in the political one. I have chosen these two "institutions" be cause the extent to which they can be successfully implemented will be a crucial factor in determin ing how far the other mechanisms of moderniza tion theory described above -i.e. competitive de mocracy, the welfare state, consumption, adap tive upgrading, inclusion, differentiation, etc. -will themselves be able to develop. In the second stage, I shall endeavour to portray the most im portant currently visible elements on the meaning level in which the overall process is embedded.
The basis for these considerations will be provided by a comparative assessment of the transforma tion process in Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovakian Republics, and the GDR/new federal states. The starting point for the first stage of the enquiry is provided below by short sketches of develop ments in the first four of these countries. A number of the points emerging are then developed in the second stage. The insights they provide into the special characteristics of transformation in the (former) GDR are discussed in more detail there after.
Comparative Assessment of the Four Countries Poland
Poland had undoubtedly made the most progress in developing a "civil society" beneath the surface of the ossified society of real socialism. The coali tion dating back to the 1970s between intellectual or church opposition groups and the labour move ment which prepared the ground for the later for mation of Solidarnosc also gave rise to a wideranging social network which, even under martial law, provided the opposition movement with a broad, well-anchored basis in all strata of society (Brus et al. 1981 , Ziemer 1989 . Although the main reason why an oppositional attitude was so widespread in the working classes was Poland's catastrophic economic situation, the prime source of the opposition movement's cohesion neverthe less lay in its political objectives and anti totalitarian values,7 (Frentzel-Zagorska 1990 , Michnik 1981 , Tatur 1991 . The chief concern was not economic reform but the desire to participate in the exercise of power or at least to have an effec tive means of monitoring that power (Michnik 1981 , Marody 1990 ). The public's economic inter ests were articulated in the political expectation of greater "social justice" to be achieved by improve ments in political transparency and codetermina tion. Hence they maintained their belief in an idea which is socialist in principle, namely that govern mental power rationalized from below via political participation ought to be in a position to serve the economic interests of the general public (Marody 1990: 270) . Although there was a marked interest during the 1980s in the willingness to accept pay differentials in accordance with levels of qualifica tion, that willingness arose out of a desire to see a socially just distribution of income according to re sponsibility, performance and education, which by no means automatically implied any acceptance of a distribution of social opportunities determined by the performance principles of the market econ omy (Buchner-Jeciorska 1992: 237, KolarskaBobinska 1988: 129 ff.). Nor indeed did it imply any consent to the fulfilment of a major precondi tion for establishing a market economy, i.e. the re privatization of state enterprises. Conflicting views on this problem did not begin to emerge in Polish society until the end of the 1980s. Opinion re search has shown a positive correlation between acceptance of privatization and higher levels of ed ucation and social status (Kolarska-Bobinska 1988 , Kolarska-Bobinska/Rychard 1990 . The practical consequences of this are shown in three tendencies, the first two of which also apply to the other countries considered here: a) Privatization provides the opportunity to carry out the redistribution of goods and services which previously occurred on the black market on a new, legal basis. The groups within society which in the past had the property, qualifications, mobility, and the right positions in social networks needed to carry out their black-market activities are now in a position to use the same factors to help them set up new businesses under the new circumstances pre vailing, possibly also using this as a means of com pensating for the loss of their jobs. From the work ers' point of view, however, their ability to partici pate in the black market normally entailed depriv-ing their employers either of their labour input or of materials. For them, privatization not only threatens their existing jobs, but it also blocks off their access to other resources which might serve as some compensation. b) Those who belonged to the "old structures" and the black-market profiteers of old accept pri vatization as an opportunity to maintain their so cial positions by using both their inside informa tion and their illegally accumulated capital to now set themselves up legally as free entrepreneurs.8 c) A schism has now opened up between the new dlite of the former opposition and the grass roots of Solidarnosc in the state-owned enterprises yet to be privatized, whose workforces are resisting any such change (Kuron 1993) . While the dlite wants to push ahead with privatization so that it can fulfil the International Monetary Fund's condi tions and enhance the country's attractiveness to foreign capital, people at the grass roots are rising up against the threat of losing their jobs by appeal ing to the original aims of the Solidarnosc move ment, turning now against the new government of the day.9 So here we see the two faces of "civil soci ety" -one of which is rooted in the conditions of real socialism and the other of which is the liberal face made possible by transformation-are con fronting one another as conflicting parties. Each of the two sides still claims its own legitimacy in terms of anti-totalitarian values, but there are substantial differences between them on interpreting those values. The electoral victory of the Left shows how great the pulling power is of expectations which grew up under real socialism that a "civil society" will take care of its citizens too. That, of course, does not mean to say that the conflict giving rise to that victory has been resolved. As the government has been relatively hesitant to interfere in the pro cess of privatization (Heidenreich 1994) , the final result will still be just a core group of nonprivatized state enterprises. As those affected in creasingly tend to equate "privatization" with "selling out the economy to foreign capital" (Lud wig 1992 , Kuron 1993 , the conflict has also now 8 Cf. Beckherrn 1991: 33 ff. on the situation in Poland, Mateju 1992 on the Czech and Slovakian Republics, and Koch/Thomas/Wodcrich 1993 on Hungary and the GDR. 9 Apart from sit-ins, strikes and mass demonstrations against "the robbery of privatization", this conflict is also now already showing additional signs of nation alist and anti-Semitic tendencies (Ludwig 1992) . A continuation of the conflict is also apparent in the newly-elected, left-wing Pawlak government.
taken on a "nationalist" component. The high val ue placed upon matters national in the semantic in ventory of Polish society (Staniszkis 1991 , Offe 1993a ) lends an excursive power to this kind of definition of the conflict which, in view of the dis appointment now rife among the majority of the general public following privatization (Kuron 1993), ought not to be underestimated. Under these circumstances, there is some plausibility to Polish analyses which neither exclude the possibili ty of privatization being forced through in an au thoritarian manner against the wishes of parlia ment, nor that of populist reactions occurring against the process (Bobinska/Rychard 1990: 317 ff.).
Hungary
Events in Hungary allow an ideal-typical picture to be built up of how an "alternative" society can be constituted within the framework of real socialism, or in other words of a case almost diametrically op posed to that of Poland. The unerring efforts of Hungary's party leadership to use whatever practi cal political scope was available to institute eco nomic reforms opened up the opportunity during the 1980s for a "second society" to develop by le galizing the shadow economy, i.e. by instituting a second wave of private-sector economic reform to add to the reforms already carried out in the state sector (Hankis 1988 , Manchin 1988 , FrentzelZagorska 1990 . The new secondary economy al lowed Hungarians not only to set up their own businesses, but also to take up activities in the pri vate sector as a supplement to their continuing em ployment in the state sector. This meant that be tween 50% and 60% of the population were able to participate in the two economic forms (Manchin 1988: 88ff.) . Thus even while real socialism per sisted, inequality in the distribution of income be gan to grow and the relative positions of the rich and the poor which had previously been character ized by real socialism began a process of marked change. The move to "economic citizenship" in Hungarian society, which at the same time incor porated the latently ubiquitous desire for a nor malization of society in line with the anti authoritarian values propagated by the elite of Hungary's opposition -once again put the coun try's communist leadership under pressure to make yet more reforms. For one thing, the need arose to channel the money earned in the secondary econo my back into the primary sector of the economy, and this was the origin of the idea of setting up a stock exchange on which shares in state-owned en terprises could be traded. For another, the social differentiation process resulting from the second ary economy brought shifts in the distribution of income which were detrimental to the communist functional elites of bureaucrats and technocrats (Galasi 1985) , spurring the latter to look for ways of capitalizing on the power they had in their hands to transform it into legitimate economic positions in the context of a reform movement.10 The pre dominance of reform tendencies within the com munist leadership then made it possible to main tain relations with the opposition elite, which was thus able to bring its influence to bear upon the Party to persuade it to accept political pluralization (Bruszt 1990 , Mänicke-Gyöngyösi 1991 . Al though public approval of the political pluralization introduced by this negotiated "revolution from above" (Bruszt 1990: 367 ff.) was high, opin ion remained divided as far as the privatization of industry and agricultural enterprises was con cerned. Approximately 60% of opinion poll re spondents said they favoured keeping land under cooperative ownership, while they felt industrial enterprises should be either state-owned or admin istered directly by their workforces. Meanwhile, 38% were in favour of privatizing enterprises by returning them to their former owners or putting them up for sale. The number of Hungarians in fa vour of privatizing agricultural land is lower still (Hankis 1990: 182-3 ).
There are two factors which may serve to explain why, when the secondary economy was legally put into practice with an associated real acceptance of economic inequality, this did not have a more posi tive influence on the attitude towards privatiza tion. The first is the prevailing attitude towards the state-owned sector based on a dual morality which, on the one hand, sees a source of security in retaining employment in state-owned enterprises, and on the other sees the opportunity to use the re sources of these enterprises for private purposes.
Here too, fear of eventual unemployment has its part to play. The second factor may lie in the func tional elite's knowledge of the structure of Hungar ian industry, built up as it was under socialist con ditions and being organized into just a small num ber of very large combines: deglomeration and pri vatization of the combines would cause serious problems and the loss of many jobs. This hesitancy to engage in the radical shock therapy of privatiza tion both among the general public and among the functional elites evidently increased the appeal to the new leadership of a third way with a mixed eco nomic system (Horn 1992 , Andorka 1992a : 216 f., Lukäcs 1992 ). This caution is also natural in the face of the pronounced polarization which has oc curred in people's economic situations. In 1992, only 13% of the population felt that their position had remained unchanged, while 50% believed it had worsened and 37% believed it had improved (Andorka 1992) . In Hungary too, the polarizing effects of transformation on the social structure are developing the potential to generate delegitimating effects. Once again, an extremely national istic populism is already developing to question the integrity of the current leadership from the right by accusing it of acting as a "demokratura" .n The same tendency has also allowed the socialist op position to regain a certain amount of political we ight.
Former Czechoslovakia
Although the Czechoslovakian opposition move ment Charta 77 was well known in the world's me dia, it was not actually very large in size and was socially relatively isolated. Thus the model of civil society oriented to community networks of dissidence gained relatively little recognition as a "con crete utopia". Charta 77 did provide a means of ar ticulating the general consensus of dissatisfaction with the regime, yet it did not have any mass, grass-roots basis. Rather, its main sounding board was among the "grey stratum" of the educated middle classes and intelligencia (Siklovä 1990 ) who, though they maintained a truce with the re gime as fellow travellers, nevertheless experienced the abnormality of it in their everyday lives. Not only for these strata but also for the majority of the general public, the most likely conceivable alterna tive to the existing regime was a democratic, par liamentary state guaranteeing the rule of law, something along the lines of the pre-war Czecho slovakian republic. After the peaceful revolution, this did indeed become the substance of the new concept of civil society and was disseminated as such by the media (Havel 1991: 44 ff., 106 ff.). The radical privatization concept also appeared com patible with this understanding of civil society, and 1 1 * it did indeed assert itself as the new economic poli cy. As surveys have shown -and as was equally clear by observing social reality -both the pro nounced identifications of political pluralism with the first Czechoslovakian republic and the radical push towards privatization combined to drive Czechoslovakian society down a road which would ultimately tear apart the unity of the nation. As shown above for Poland and Hungary, the effects of privatization and attitudes to it divide society in former Czechoslovakia into two separate groups: whereas the less well-qualified and relatively uned ucated strata see the security of their social posi tions being eroded by privatization and fear cuts in their income or unemployment, the middle classes sense that they have an opportunity to better their position (Mateju 1992 , Vecernik 1991 .
What would appear at first sight to be the normal expected adjustment to the stratification patterns of capitalist society takes on a completely different hue if the trends in what are now two different re publics are viewed separately. Even in 1992, that is to say before partition, acceptance of the political and economic transformation in the Czech Repub lic was over 60%, whereas only 30% of respon dents showed a positive attitude to the changes in the Slovakian Republic. In Slovakia, the pre-war republic of the combined nations was not regarded at all as a model for the new democratic state. Around 40% of people polled in Slovakia said they were prepared to disregard a democratically elect ed parliament and a constitution established on that basis (against 27% in what is now the Czech Republic). Likewise, the threat to social security posed by privatization is perceived much more keenly in Slovakia. There, the majority blame the economic ills of the present day not on the mis management which occurred under socialism, but on the post-socialist reforms (Butorova 1992). Quite evidently, two different patterns of interpre tation had begun to crystallize, and these differ ences cannot be explained solely in terms of the nationalist tensions which previously were latent and now had the opportunity to burst to the sur face once again. Although that is indeed indicated by the low proportion of Slovakians equating de mocracy with the pre-war Czechoslovakian repub lic, there is also another phenomenon at play here: a pattern emerges of different levels of identifica tion with the real socialist past, and a substantial gap in the willingness to deal with that past by en gaging in radical privatization of state-owned en terprises. This is a late consequence of the differ ing levels of development of the two parts of the country at the time they began their forty-year pe riod of real socialism. Whereas the Czech Repub lic, which was already highly-industrialized and quite socially differentiated, experienced the so cialist era as a period of demodernization in its so cietal structure, Slovakia actually went through its strongest period of industrialization during these forty years, bringing a pronounced improvement in the standard of living and also an increase in its own political influence within the nation as a whole. Quite evidently, the egalitarianism which developed under real socialism, accompanied by the expectation that the state would cater for per sonal needs and thus bring about social justice, be came much more deeply associated on a longerterm basis with the notion of economic and social security in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. The feeling that the reforms originating in Prague were threatening this past security was further re inforced by the awareness of economic and politi cal dependence on the Czech portion of the na tion. That opened up a window of opportunity for a left-wing, populist movement which wanted, by partitioning the state, to slow down the reforms or at least bring them under its own control; on that basis, this movement was also able to assert itself against the conservative nationalist tendency also existing in Slovakia. In view of these evident leftwing tendencies, the Czech leadership was at pains to keep its own reform course intact and hence ac cepted, or indeed itself encouraged the partition of the state. Of course, partition did not eliminate the sources of social conflict arising as life chances and stan dards of living continued to drift apart. Although expectations of an improvement in the economy are much greater in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia, 50% of Czechs and approximately 60% of Slovakians believe their personal economic situ ations have worsened, while 20% in the Czech Re public and 11% in the Slovakian count themselves as gainers (Slejska 1993) . In spite of its radical neo liberal rhetoric, the Czech government is still com pelled to keep a protective arm around the majori ty of large enterprises for the sake of avoiding mass unemployment.12 Even though the current eco nomic position of the Czech Republic would ap pear to be considerably more stable than that of the other countries under review, if its large indus tries were to be radically privatized or compelled by any other means to function strictly according to the laws of the marketplace, this would bring a considerable loss of jobs.13 The converse situation can be found in Slovakia. Because of the desire to attract investment capital from the west, it is rec ognized -whatever the rhetorical objections made to shock therapy -that privatization offers the on ly way of achieving this. One can expect the ulti mate consequences to be the same in both of the new republics. Partition has also failed to put an end to ethnic ten sions, and all that has happened is that they have been channelled in new directions. In Slovakia, el ements with a pronounced nationalist colour can be detected in the attitudes taken to political and economic developments. These are manifested in a relatively-high incidence of anti-Semitism, in mis givings applying to the Hungarian minority and fi nally in the negative attitude towards foreign capi tal (65%) (Butorova 1992 , Slejska 1993 ). In the Czech Republic, too, there are tendencies in the political arena which could charge the social con flicts now breaking to the surface with additional nationalist or ethnicist potential. A populist, rightwing "Republican Party" has been making use of the tension between Czechs and Sudeten Germans to stoke up nationalist sentiment, and has been supported in this by the post-communist left. In the heart of the country, the gypsy minority is par ticularly liable to encounter hostile attitudes. Meanwhile, at the regional level tension is also ap parent between Bohemians and Moravians when it comes to rearranging the federal structure.
Consequences of Privatization
The upheavals in social structure and associated lifestyles in what used to be real socialism are at their most evident in as far as they result from the restructuring of the economy.14 The main implica 13 A characteristic example of this hesitancy was the re peated postponement of the date when a set of laws would take effect which would have allowed stateowned enterprises in the Czech republic to declare * bankruptcy. Even now that they have been passed, the laws are not applied despite the huge mutual in debtedness of the large enterprises which are strictly insolvent. (Heidenreich 1994 ). 14 The basic economic parameters for the countries un der review are as follows: Poland -unemployment rate 15.2%, inflation 1989/90: 700%, 1991/92: 60%, tions of the privatization of the economy institut ed after the collapse of communism include, on the one hand, the elimination of government subsi dies, the break-up of central control institutions and a reduction in over-employment by way of ra tionalization and closing down certain enterprises. The consequences are unemployment (hitherto unknown in these countries), high inflation and a drop in gross national product. On the other, pri vatization has released new economic impetus, which in turn has set in motion the development of social inequality and social mobility. The distribu tion of income and wealth have now begun to take on the broad ranges familiar to us from statistics in western European countries, with the whole spec trum from unemployed single parents through to multimillionaires (Andorka 1992 , Beckherrn 1992 : 42 ff., Stieler 1992 ). In the process of primary cap ital accumulation now gathering pace, wealth ob tained not only from ordinary black marketeering but also from the secret business transactions of the nomenklatura was now able to be legalized. Yet another effect of privatization, though, was that occupational positions, the significance of which for social status and income distribution had be come blurred under real socialism, now once again took on the importance of real starting conditions for social and economic advancement or decline.
The main determinants of these starting conditions are: a) the structural context of a particular occupa tional stratum or position under real socialism, b) the newly-emerging rules of the real labour market, c) the specific manner in which privatization has been conducted in particular countries. One structural characteristic clearly in evidence as the employment structure changes in accordance with the rules of the late-capitalist labour market is that a large number of female employees have lost their jobs.17 Freedom of movement between coun tries, and exchange-rate and wage differentials are giving rise to a migratory movement of those seek ing work, along an east-west axis. While eastern Germans travel to western Germany to find work, Poles, Czechs and Hungarians are seeking employ ment in eastern and western Germany. Mean while, in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary them selves, cheap labour is now available from the Uk raine, Russia and Romania. On c) above: a substantial influence on the distri bution of starting opportunities is exerted by the manner in which the privatization itself is carried out. To begin with, this has a determinative effect on the level of unemployment. For example, enter prises in Germany's new federal states lost their eastern markets overnight as a consequence of monetary union, and the radical privatization poli cy of the Treuhand organization ("privatization be fore rehabilitation") brought the loss of more than four million jobs,18 whereas the strategy of coupon privatization being applied in former Czechoslova kia, particularly in Bohemia, would appear to be generating less unemployment in its wake. An im portant factor here is that the Treuhand has main tained a firm policy of selling only to outside inves tors with adequate capital, while other countries are aiming to practice various types of "people's 17 This appears to be a universal trend in all of the countries under review: see Stieler 1992 , Titkow 1992 , Cermakova 1991 Of the approx. 9.7 million people previously em ployed in the GDR, approx. 6.2 million have re tained a job. Of the 3.5 million who lost theirs, 1.1 million are officially unemployed, while the rest are working short time, on job creation schemes, retrain ing or commuting to the west -data from the Federal Labour Agency reported in Frankfurter Allgemeine 7.10.92, p.13. However, these figures do not proper ly record the "hidden reserve" of unemployed people not registered as such, and the figure for people cur rently in work must therefore be regarded as too high. A suitably adjusted estimate of the number of jobs lost is therefore in the order of 4.5 million (Müller-Hartmann 1993: 304) . If one then also con siders that particular industries such as textiles dr leatherwork have seen the loss of 60%-80% of the jobs they originally provided (Frankfurter Allgeme ine 12.10.92, p.15), it will be readily apparent that regional pockets of unemployment are well above the overall average rate.
capitalism", with a view to raising the acceptance of privatization as such.19 It seems the govern ments in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest would pre fer to postpone what most agree is the necessary step of exposing large-scale industry to free market forces. Another source of new opportunities for es tablishing private businesses is the restoration of land and buildings to their original owners. Here too, significant local differences can be found. For example, in the Czech Republic this factor is al ready beginning to play a significant part in the emergence of a new class of small and mediumscale business proprietors, but in the new federal states of Germany two-thirds of the applications made for restoration of title have come from the western part of Germany,20 thus restricting the op portunities for former citizens of the GDR to es tablish small and medium-sized firms of their own. The fact that the redistribution of starting opportu nities and social positions has occurred so suddenly is generating a substantial amount of status insecu rity.21 When this effect is combined with the surviv ing dual morality of real socialism, status insecuri ty makes the pure biological or social chance of be longing to a particular ethnic group or community take on a new significance as a final haven of safe ty. In this respect, polarizing interpretational sche mes in the shape of nationalism, all manner of forms of aggressive regionalism and rehashed my thologies of the past tend to reemerge to provide legitimation for these last havens of security.22 *
Consequences of Political Pluralization
Political pluralization in the countries under re view, the acceptance of which was the key point of consensus when it came to sweeping aside the oneparty rule of real socialism has, as far as it is possi ble to observe, already passed through three phas- es since the transition from communist power.23 Following the original undermining of the power of the Party by alternative elites (phase one), polit ical forces then began to crystallize in a new form which increasingly restricted the influence of the dissidents, i.e. of the original transitional elites (phase two). The newly-emerged interest groups crosscut the original movements of collective op position. Their representatives, now legitimately elected, no longer project their images primarily by resorting to the original "anti-totalitarian" val ues of dissent, but by putting forward programmes which respond in a challenging or critical way to the problems associated with the new social and economic distinctions in society (phase three). That now takes the process of political differentia tion into a fourth phase in which one of the crucial questions will be whether the "anti-totalitarian" values already have a latent effect, meaning that people will want or be able to uphold these values even in the face of the economic and social sacrific es already being made or still to be expected. This factor is of vital significance to what happens dur ing the U-curve. I shall return to the theme later when dealing with elites. The second crucial factor during this new phase is the attitude to the process of privatization, which will now be seen either as the cause of such sacri fices or rather as the opportunity to overcome them. The link in interests between the various party political opinions now beginning to crystal lize on either side of this dividing line and the shake-up in the pattern of living situations and po tential client-groups brought about by privatiza tion would appear not to be very highly developed as yet, so it is hardly yet possible to speak of com petitive democracy. The new elites did not come to power as upholders of the interests of particular social groups (Meyer 1993) . Instead, the parties and clienteles currently on the scene are distin guished for the time being according to their own internal criteria, i.e. the wish to maintain power for the former and the improvement, maintenance or loss of social position for the latter, without the two sides having yet formed any firm "interest communities". The process in which parties seek a 23 Translator's note: the German term "die Wende" (the turn) clearly expresses a pronounced change of direction and the opening of a new chapter -for the remainder of the paper "transition" and "transitional Elites" will be used for want of better alternatives to convey this meaning, and hence to refer to the period of abrupt change (or the peaceful revolution) as the old real socialist regimes were brought down or fell.
suitable electorate, while voters now uncertain of their own status seek suitable bodies to represent their interests, is only just beginning. The volatile switches in the electorate's preferences from right to left currently apparent in Poland, Hungary and the former GDR, may be regarded as a manifesta tion of this process. As far as the potential political responses to the consequences of privatization are concerned, there are several options for the future development of the system, spanning from the classic combination of a market economy and par liamentary democracy, via a "third way" in a num ber of different guises, to anti-liberal populism at the other end of the scale. Events so far in the four countries in question in fact show features of all three of the above vari ants. In all of them, there is a certain reluctance to really tackle large-scale privatization, and in Hun gary this goes hand-in-hand with the rejection of shock therapies and considerations of a possible third way (Stark 1992 , Horn 1992 , Andorka 1992a . Simultaneously though, a right-wing popu list movement has developed which has split away from the governing party. Hungary's socialist op position, too, is recovering strength. In Poland, the enforcement of privatization in the face of re sistance from the workforces concerned has now brought the Left back into government. It now ap pears to be in the realm of the possible that privat ization will be supported by the use of extraparliamentary special powers as a countermove to these changes.24 In former Czechoslovakia, accep tance of political and economic liberalism in the Czech part of the country confronted a much greater scepticism towards privatization and leftwing populism in Slovakia. The collision between these contrary options in the context of a newly awakening nationalism sealed the final collapse of the combined nations.
The Meaning Level in the Transformation Process
As we have seen, even at the structural level of the transformation process, differing configurations can be identified which may produce quite sub stantial local variations in the path traced by the process as a whole. However, if one wishes to pen-24 Groups favouring this option were already in evi dence in Poland before the change of government. See Kolarska-Bobinska 1988 and KolarskaBobinska/ Ry chard 1990.
etrate through to the manner in which these vari ants develop their own concrete shape, then iden tifying common structural prescriptions and con straints arising from privatization in the economy and pluralization of politics in the real socialist en vironment can only be the first step in that direc tion, and not a sufficient one. It is equally impor tant to examine the semantic inventory25 related to that environment, or in other words the meaning level underlying the prevailing action orientations and expectations in which the social mechanisms of everyday organization and the long-term accep tance of government, political or everyday social action are embedded. To attain a faithful picture of these local variants in the transformation process, then, it is important to find some way of gaining access to and visualizing this meaning level. I would like to draw particular attention to the fol lowing elements of the semantic inventory, which are relevant to the question posed in this paper: 1. The first key element is that of collective self definition. The expression applies to a number of aspects indicating how individuals and social groups locate their own positions during the trans formation process and/or the attitudes they adopt to it. The first constituent aspect is the "concrete utopia" (Horkheimer 1988: 193 ff.) inherent in so cially recalled tradition, which fixes certain soci etal development options and action preferences not yet realized to each actor's horizon of rele vance. Also included in this are attitudes to what, having been legitimated by that utopia, eventually becomes social reality and shapes people's conduct of their lives by its structural presence in the real world. Whereas the utopia is normally articulated by the definitional power of elites,26 and especially of the intellectuals, the second aspect is manifest ed in the momentary pictures obtained from opin ion polls. The second of the two aspects also throws light upon a horizon of relevance, but in this case it is shaped by everyday action, just as it also provides orientations for it. 2. A second element of importance when consid ering the meaning dimension of the transforma tion process is the social acceptance of the defini tional power of Elites cited above or, turned the other way, the ability of the intellectual 61ite to ex ercise its definitional power on a legitimate basis. Following Eisenstadt, one may formulate this in the terms that elites with a strong cohesion and a high degree of legitimated definitional autonomy can be classed as successful carriers of transforma tion processes (Eisenstadt 1979: 355) . 3. The means used by elites to exercise their de finitional powers have their roots in the existing se mantic inventory, and especially in whatever ori entation this contains for conducting everyday life. Thus everyday orientations and expectation struc tures must be taken as a third important element for the meaning level in transformation processes. 4. These orientations and expectation structures are also associated with corresponding typical ac tion strategies and typical structures of social rela tions, and they give shape to the level of concrete actions and goal attainment as well-proven problem-solving practices. As such, they too con stitute a fourth element of significance for the meaning level in the transformation process. With regard to the substrata of action orientations denoted by the above elements, a number of gen eral aspects can also be pointed out which have brought forth familiar patterns in the transforma tion process in the countries observed. With the ex ception of the first of these aspects highlighted, namely dual morality and networks, I shall treat them below by looking first at Poland, former Czechoslovakia and Hungary, going on later to take a separate look at the special case of the new federal states (former GDR).
Dual Morality and Networks
I proceed first to sketch briefly the everyday action orientations and practices shaped by real socialism and mentioned in points 3 and 4 above, because they serve, as it were, as a life-world foundation for self-definition and legitimation, and make their effects felt upon them. A characteristic, paradoxical consequence of the planned economy system originally designed to be rational and transparent was the sheer unpredict ability caused by its insurmountable problems of coordination, allocation and distribution. This led, both in government and private spheres, to the de velopment of alternative social redistribution net works which were absolutely vital for the system to continue functioning; these constituted the broad area generally known as the shadow economy, though it also at times took on legal forms, as in the case of provision for the top officials of the "nomenklatura". Owing to the principle that party decisions were to take priority over any existing statutory regulations, this institutional unpredict ability also extended into the all-embracing field of governmental administration. Here too, a system emerged for securing and redistributing output and services -in other words, a system of patron age and corruption -which was closely intermeshed with the redistribution networks in the economic sphere (Srubar 1991) . If "civil society" is understood to mean the manner in which citizens organize themselves in order to realize those inter ests the system cannot cater for, then it was these redistribution networks which made up everyday civil society under real socialism. The effect of this upon action orientation was to create a "dual morality": 27 on the one hand, this rejected any restrictive dependence on the state and denied total loyalty to its institutions even though membership of them was retained; on the other hand, making use of precisely those institu tions and membership positions within them for the purposes of upholding one's own supply net works was positively sanctioned. This dual morali ty in which passiveness or reduced effort towards the public sphere contrasted with active private initiative in the context of people's own networks, generated increasing insularity in society along the lines of an exclusive morality which applies differ ing in-group and out-group criteria, while combin ing its friend/foe perspective with a preference for resolving all manner of problems by way of private relationships (Srubar 1991: 423 ff.) . This dual mo rality of networks and its inbuilt mechanisms of so cial inclusion and exclusion have continued to function after the revolution as the preferred pat terns of action and communication. Their effects which, on the one hand, are exclusive, but on the other engender solidarity, are now being amplified by the redistribution opportunities inherent in the new political and economic orders.
"Civil Society" as a "Concrete Utopia"
The concrete utopia buoying up opposition think ing in central Europe can undoubtedly be taken to be the concept of "civil society" which developed on a parallel basis in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.28 * This is naturally considerably different (Dahrendorf 1990: 111) . Belief in these "anti-totalitarian" values as a con crete utopian project for the future is nurtured, on the one hand, by an idealized past of Europe's civic (bürgerlich), anti-authoritarian traditions, thus ap parently supporting Habermas' thesis of the past as the future (Habermas 1990: 74ff.) . On the oth er, albeit through rose-coloured spectacles, it gen erates the concept of a future in which "normal" conditions will return to society once totalitarian suppression is removed (Havel 1990 : 115, Konräd 1984 . Against the backdrop of a latent consensus on the abnormality of everyday life under real so cialism, the indeterminate expectation already mentioned of normalization, civilization and hu manization in society began to crystallize, in con junction with an equally indeterminate, grouprelated general perspective of social justice. This formed the basis for the latent rejection of the re gime on the everyday level (Andorka 1992a , Bauer 1991 , Ziolkowski 1988 ). However, the integrative effect of such a concrete utopia of civil society is counteracted by a number of other elements derived from the real socialist context in which the construct was developed, as outlined below. Firstly, the conceptions of how civil society should be socially realized may ultimately prove counter-1993. Readers will appreciate that this is not the place to delve into the origins of the term or its histo ry since the 17th Century -on this, see works such as Shils 1991 and Taylor 1991. The fundamental distinc tion between the traditional bourgeois concept and the idea of civil society as discussed in this context is that the latter was not linked to the factual existence of a market economy or with the idea of institutional ized political authority. Cf., e.g., Tatur 1991 , Ash 1990 productive.29 The idea of an "institutionless" soci ety organizing itself against a totalitarian power could be seen being put into practice in the infor mal groups and networks of movements such as Charta 77, KOR or Solidarnosc. These structural patterns were not simply forced upon them by their necessarily conspiratorial nature. At the same time, their programmatic, radical scepticism of in stitutions and formal procedures of any kind, their "personnel policy" which relied entirely upon per sonal but not necessarily upon ideological loyalty manifested the network-based organization of so cial relations which typified life under real social ism in general, with its dual morality of private loy alty coupled with an evasive or disdainful ap proach to "public" concerns. After the transition, these behavioural patterns associated with what might be described as "unpolitical politics" or "anti-politics" soon came into conflict with the manner of their legitimation by the antitotalitarian values of a rational, sceptical, demo cratic, tolerant civil society. The need for the state in which the dissident groups participated during the initial phase to be subsequently restructured forced what had formerly been loose movements to become more institutionalized, decision-making to be formalized, and political standards to be set. Tolerance was thus transformed into the formal right of free expression, yet at the same time it ceased to be a principle of group discourse.30 The civic forums and round tables disintegrated into in terest parties, and hence became institutions which are now engaged in a constant political war of attrition against one another before the public eye. This mechanism played no small part in the decline in the dissident groups' influence and the fact that their members have been displaced from the political scene.
Another factor acting as a major obstacle to the in tegrative effect of "civil society" as a concrete uto pia is the unresolved relationship between political and economic order within the ideal. The commu nal model of a society organizing itself on a basis of solidarity is not readily compatible with the liberal concept of private property and the marketplace acting as society's self-ordering mechanisms. In this context, the demand for the restitution of property which had been seized by the state was thematized not from an economic perspective but predominantly from an ethical one. Indeed, even the members of intellectual elites who were dis cussing this problem from political and economic perspectives believed that market socialism or "people's capitalism", including state or mixed ownership of enterprises with a considerable par ticipating share to be held by their workforces, represented the most promising ways ahead, offer ing as they did the best assurance of full employ ment and social redistribution measures.31 The dis crepancy between what actually happened with the advent of privatization in these economies and the above theoretical considerations on the eco nomic system best suited for a post-socialist civil society is glaringly obvious. This discrepancy also therefore poses legitimation obstacles to the "antitotalitarian values" transported by the concrete utopia of civil society. To sum up: while the move to political pluralism had always been a constituent element of the "civil society" concept -whatever the differing views on how to bring it about -the same could not be said at all for privatization in the economy. It was not until the transformation process gathered momen tum that the concept of civil society began to un dergo a change of meaning: the legitimating, antitotalitarian values have remained the same, but the social basis on which they are to be realized has now shifted away from a community in solidarity of the oppressed towards the liberal model of Smith's "invisible hand". However, against this background, a liberal market can ultimately only attain legitimacy as a means of attaining greater social justice, so the problems of ownership, pri vatization and associated policies are tending to be drawn into a vortex of moralization, while at the same time setting new criteria of social respect and disrespect.32 * That too creates fault-lines in differ ent groups' legitimatory view of themselves in these countries, which plays a significant part as far as acceptance of the transformation process is concerned.
31 This discussion was partly conducted in exile and partly in the countries themselves. See Bras 1990 , Bras/Laski 1990 , Sik 1990 , pp.97ff., Balcerovicz 1990 . In Hungary, too, a good deal of emphasis was placed on the need to build a framework of social re distribution measures around a properly functioning market -on this, cf. Mänicke-Gyöngyösi 1991. 32 The "moral fundamentalism" of expectations borne by the concept of civil society is demonstrated by Tatur 1991, pp. 239ff.
Elites
The problem of the definitional power of elites and the acceptance, or otherwise, of that power which arises on the meaning level of the transformation process develops against a background in which al ternative opposition elites are inevitably trans formed into a functional dike supporting a new system. Viewed in ideal-typical terms, the counter elites in real socialist countries should be treated as value elites whose influence and legitimation are derived from the charisma of the ideas they advo cate and/or the way they conduct their lives. These were alternative groupings characterized by the in formality of their influence and of their social or ganization. In contrast to this, functional elites in their ideal-typical form are, at least formally, legi timated in terms of their qualifications and their performance, are formally vested with executive powers, and generally carry the main decision making load in the social systems in which they take up the top political, economic, military and administrative positions.33 Hence, to the extent that functional Elites, by instituting a division of la bour in the organization of power, are able to hold it indefinitely, the transformation of a value elite into a functional elite will be accompanied by phe nomena decribed by Max Weber himself ([1922] 1976: 681 ff.) when he demonstrated that a sus tained stabilization of charismatic leadership would go hand-in-hand with transition to the ev eryday, i.e. with its transformation to establish a bureaucratic organization of power. Which characteristics of this ideal-typical construct are discernible in the real world of the transforma tion of real socialism? Bearing in mind how the dis sident Elites viewed their own position as they ad vocated their anti-institutional concept of civil so ciety, we gain some idea of the adjustment prob lems facing members of those elites by the transi tion to a new system. On the other side of the coin, the expectation at the level of everyday life which is also partly derived from the civil society concept is that societal institutions will again begin to func tion normally, and that also implies the further ex pectation that functional elites will act competent ly. From a structural point of view, this situation gi ves rise to two dilemmas which shape the relation ship between Elites and the general public in the post-socialist countries:
1. The legitimation of the oppositional value dikes was chiefly founded on their quintessential^ moral claim (Tatur 1991 : 239ff., Berking/Neckel 1991 : 293, Havel 1980 ) "to live in truth" by matching their words and their deeds -a claim which at times takes on fundamentalist forms (Havel 1980: 29ff.) . The everyday plausibility of this moral claim flows from the collective schizophrenic expe rience of rejecting the regime while simultaneously accommodating to it. Yet it is accepted as one of the essential preconditions for the normalization of life and society associated with that moral claim that political pluralism and competent functional dikes will be established. And that very process of realizing political pluralism which came with the transition divided up the members of what had previously been the alternative value dike into var ious interest groups, simultaneously propelling them into the now vacant positions and roles of the functional elite; the result was a new rivalry for de finitional power among the transitional Elites ( Wendeeliten). The ensuing pragmatic necessity for political compromise naturally no longer permit ted the ethical principles of action -i.e., purely value-rational action -to be upheld in full. The ap parent lack of principles in political action is anath ema to the transitional dike's legitimation claim (as a value dike) based on moral fundamentalism and hence invalidates that claim. The difficulty of translating the integrity of personal lifestyles into pragmatic, political action which becomes appar ent at this stage34 has also been acting as a factor of selection in driving some of the dissidents back out of political life. 2. The second dilemma is a mirror image of the first. As the value dike begins to undergo function al change it not only loses its moral legitimation, but is also incapable of activating the new means of legitimation which applies to a functional dike quickly enough, i.e. legitimation on the basis of performance and competence. There are several reasons for this, as discussed below. Due to their lack of professional experience and insufficient personnel resources, the dikes of the transition period are forced to rely on the coopera tion of the old functional dike and, informally at least, have to leave openings available for it to par ticipate. Quite apart from the fact that this further undermines the new elite's moral legitimation, in the public's perception it also engenders doubts as to the competence not only of the transitional dike which has been forced to bring in outside help but 34 On this problem, see Mänicke-Gyöngyösi 1990.
also of their "auxiliary troops" from the old no menklatura, who after all bear responsibility for the failure of real socialism. Within the new dlite formation which thus emerg es, personal loyalty is an absolutely essential means of reducing complexity. So it was that new functional Elites came to be recruited via the in formal relationships existing in the networks to which the new holders of office belonged, all of whom formed their own retinues of assistants. Gi ven that it was a practical impossibility that all the members of such networks would be suitably qualified for their new tasks, the situation arose in which unqualified people took up new offices sim ply on grounds of loyalty. That in itself might not have been so serious, had it not been for the fact that the recruitment procedure inevitably exclud ed people who did not belong to the right net works, who found themselves displaced by the asymmetry of the institutionalized position of those holding office. Though this system of pa tronage tends to stabilize people's positions within the individual groups constituting the new func tional dlite, it simultaneously widens the split be tween rival groupings within the overall structure. Both the patronage system and the displacement of other, qualified people from public office con travene the principle that a functional elite be le gitimated in terms of its competence and perfor mance. Moreoever, the end result is a copy of the recruitment and exclusion patterns which typified the old nomenklatura. Another phenomenon which fits in with this perceived pattern is the fre quently "spontaneous" executive style, skirting around formal procedures, used by the new hold ers of office. Even if one admits that, from a structural viewpoint, those concerned have no other social techniques for organizing power available to them in the context of an executive system shaped by the conditions of real socialism, that does nothing to alleviate the delegitimating effect of such a management style. Beyond that lies a further danger which had already been iden tified by O 'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 66) , namely that the techniques applied ad hoc during a period of transformation to reach pragmatic so lutions to problems later tend, as they maintain, to become fully institutionalized mechanisms of the new order. Similar effects are generated by the "helpyourself" tendencies already mentioned among the new functional Elites, members of which ex ploit their inside knowledge and their positions to use the policy of privatization to establish their own businesses.35 The ease with which these peo ple make use of the services and privileges associ ated with the positions and offices they hold, to gether with the fact that they inevitably adopt new forms of behaviour to match,36 completes this pic ture of an emerging style of recruitment and action in the new elites which integrates the old patterns of thinking and acting, thus providing an expansive target for popular resentment.
To sum up, the new elites contain only a small number of people whose integrity is assured by their past activities as dissidents in opposition and who can exercise an integrating, watchful role. In most cases, they are made up of former members of the functional Elites operating under the old re gime who, as such, are liable to be compromised at any time by "revelations" about their past. Since the overall atmosphere of the transformation pro cess is one in which public perceptions are extraor dinarily sensitive to moral considerations, the manner in which the new Elites act is particularly strongly exposed to social respect or disdain. The criteria for these value judgments are derived to a considerable degree from drawing comparisons with the Elites under the old regime who are clas sed as morally despicable. In the light of this pres sure from the public perception, the need to be willing to compromise and be pragmatic in politi cal actions undermines the moral legitimation for mally enjoyed by the transitional elites as true val ue elites. At the same time, the transitional Elites are unable to activate any new legitimation as pluralist func tional Elites to a sufficient degree because the man ner of their recruitment and the actions they take do not conform to the criteria of performance and competence oriented to the public at large. As a result, the implementation of economic privatiza tion by the political Elites is embedded in a frame work which imposes a negative burden both on an 61ite itself and upon the prospective results of re form. Not only ought privatization to establish the economic conditions for reconstruction but, above all, it ought by installing proper market mecha nisms to turn the economic sphere as a whole over to a civic process of self-regulation which is largely independent of the political sphere. Such relief of 35 A survey of Czechoslovakian members of parlia ment, for example, showed approximately 60% of them were active as private entrepreneurs. Cf. Lidov6 noviny, 10.9.92, p. 1. 36 On these mechanisms of self-representation, see Goffman 1983: 23ff. an entire system is not being achieved at present because, from the perspective of the comparability between the new elites and the old nomenklatura, the effects of the market observable to the public are interpreted as actions with a political intent to serve the interests of the new political class. The result is that decision-making power and responsi bility for economic events continue to be attribut ed to that political class.
A sensitive yet precise de scription of this state of affairs is provided by the recent coining of the terms "demokratura" and "nomenklatura capitalism".37 How might it be possible to escape from the dilem mas I have illustrated? There are two typical cours es of action which transitional elites might take as they transform theselves from value elites into functional elites, and both are indeed empirically in evidence in the post-socialist countries under consideration.
1. The transitional elites can endeavour to solve their legitimacy problems by resorting to moral le gitimation schemes, i.e. by consolidating their rep utation as value elites. They may do this by reject ing compromise politics and developing simple, bi nary schemes of judgment in accordance with the existing moral response pattern of respect-ordisdain.38This allows them without difficulty to re activate the habitual expectations developed un der real socialism built around the dual, exclusive morality with its potential for establishing solidari ty against "external foes". This type of solution is in evidence in the populist tendencies now appar ent in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and also in the left-wing variant which has been able to assert itself in Slovakia. where the habitualized action orientations of real socialism have left off. How should these developments be assessed with regard to the future course of the transformation process? We have worked on the assumption that an important part in shaping action orientations during the transformation process is played by the definitional power of Elites, and hence also that the acceptance of these Elites is an expression of willingness to bow to their definitional power. We added to this assumption Eisenstadt's thesis that elites are successful in a process of transformation if they fulfil the conditions of being autonomous in their definitional capacity, having good internal solidarity, and being regarded as legitimate by the general public. To what extent, then, are these conditions fulfilled by the reforming countries' transitional elites as they transform themselves? The above analysis of the meaning dimension in the transformation of Elites has clearly pointed up the associated legitimation problems. Internal soli darity within the various transitional Elites now in the course of functional differentiation, which are nevertheless recruited via the informal networks of their own particular "chiefs" and characterized by rivalry to gain definitional power among partic ular groupings, can hardly be described as high. Any attempts to exercise definitional autonomy are therefore likely either to rely on the real-world asymmetry of power (i.e., to adopt an authoritari an line) or else to resort once again to a moralizing value legitimation by playing the populist card. Ei ther of these approaches may result in the original ly intended objectives of institutionalizing political pluralism being rendered unattainable.
A Special Variant: The Former GDR/ New Federal States
I have deliberately chosen to treat the local variant of the transformation process in the former GDR (new federal states) as a special case. That does not mean to say that the overall problems arising from privatization and political pluralization are essen tially any different. What are quite different, how ever, are the frame conditions which also deter mine how these problems are dealt with. These dif ferences in the frame conditions naturally include the obvious advantages accruing to the transfor mation process in the new federal states, namely large-scale financial assistance, administrative, po litical and technical expertise and immediate inte gration into the western transnational organiza tions of which the Federal Republic of Germany has long been a member. Nevertheless, the preced ing analysis suggests that here too, as in the other countries, there are a number of possible scenarios as to how the "modernizing" institutions will be implemented. In a nutshell, one might say that the particular frame conditions governing the transfor mation process in the new federal states are also giving rise to a particular set of obstacles.
Using the concept of civil society as a form of "probe" to bring these peculiarities into view, it is soon apparent that the first of the peculiarities in the situation of the former GDR is that this society did not develop its own idea of civil society as a concrete utopia; instead, the alternative to the ex isting regime consisted simply in joining what to all intents and purposes was a ready-made civil soci ety.40 When set against this alternative as seen by the majority of the population, the peacemovement, ecological or reformed socialist con cepts put forward by the country's intellectual op position, which in any case was not widely articu lated, appeared too abstract, too uncertain, and not forceful enough. The dissident movement which had been gathering since the mid-1980s did not have enough time to develop counter-elites with their own "designs" for future society (Wielgohs/Schulz 1993). The concrete utopia of acces sion to the Federal Republic not only promised that societal and political "normality", as already visible in concrete form, would presumably set in once the totalitarian regime had collapsed: more than that, it also promised unproblematic prosper ity and material security. According to the evi dence of electoral analyses and opinion polls, it would appear that the latter reason rather than any articulated desire for political normality, which was bound to come in any case, lent true appeal to the concrete utopia of reunification.41 * * However, it 40 Meyer (1993: 19) rightly points out that the protest actions which really triggered off the DDR's final cri sis were not the street demonstrations calling for de mocracy but the preference for the other part of Ger many expressed by those who joined the mass exodus. 41 On the primarily "material" electoral motivation in the former GDR after the transition, see Roth 1990 and also Bauer 1991 , Gesincke 1991 and Offe 1993 . A harsh judgment in this regard is made by Kurt Bie denkopf in : Smolar 1991/92: 19 : "This prolonged phase of paternalistic organization of the state pro duced a population which truly was incapable, as in deed it continues to be to a considerable extent, of establishing autonomous societal structures, and which even today is largely unable to comprehend the principles of a civil society."
is at the same time fair to assume that similar mor al expectations were made of the "transformation by reunification", and of the actors carrying it out, to those coupled with the legitimation of the tran sitional Elites in the other countries examined. That means that the anomic shock, which people in the former GDR have experienced just as their counterparts in the other post-socialist countries of central Europe have done as the economic and po litical systems have collapsed, now sits all the deeper.
Economic developments in the new federal states have shown what the future might hold for the oth er four countries if they were to carry out a radical privatization programme. Something in the order of 40% of the jobs previously available have now disappeared, and industrial production has fallen to approximately one third of its former level. On ly the financial resources transferred from the west have been able to cushion the blow to a tolerable degree. That dependence brings us to a related special feature of the transformation process in the former GDR, namely that political forces in the country did not crystallize, and were not articulat ed, autonomously after the transition, and hence no transitional elite emerged which could be moni tored according to the criteria of moral legitima tion. The population of the old GDR was thus un able to control either political or economic devel opments on its own initiative, via an elite of its own. The problems and issues arising from eco nomic and political developments -which in the experiential horizons of real socialism tend, as has been shown, to be regarded chiefly as the conse quence of political actions taken by ruling Elitescannot be dealt with using the mechanisms of mor al discourse acquired by "home-grown" socializa tion, since they are understood and presented by western German managers and officials in the differentiated communication codes of their own "value-neutral" rationalities of the economic and administrative spheres. This asymmetry is mani fested in semantically concentrated form in the use of the term "Abwicklung" when dealing with the former state institutions and enterprises [which has the dual English meaning of "dealing with" in the context of administrative business and "wind ing up" in commercial bankruptcy proceedingstranslator's note]. This poses a problem when it co mes to establishing links between the action of western functional Elites and the semantic invento ry of those affected in the eastern part of the coun try. In other words, although the new federal states have avoided the legitimation dilemma associated with the transformation of value Elites into func tional elites in the other post-socialist countries, the new functional elite in operation there faces a legitimation problem of its own special kind. If one applies Eisenstadt's thesis as a comparative matrix, the following picture emerges. The former intellectual elite of the country -in both its func tional and its oppositional variants -has virtually no definitional power. On the other hand, the new political class in the new federal states is con strained in its definitional power because it is inev itably western-centred. As a result, it is barely able to adjust to local needs, and cannot act and com municate in the social codes handed down to it. To a considerable extent, it does not have a mastery of the semantics and patterns of real-socialist adjust ment, nor is it able to derive any legitimacy from a "concrete utopia" which has developed organically within the new federal states. That political class is split according to its western or eastern origins, the split being deeper in terms of mentality than in those of political creed.42 The composition of the new elite is itself a further feature peculiar to the new federal states. The western administration does have to rely, in a similar situation to the tran sitional elites of central Europe, on the coopera tion of the old functional Elites. However, in order to gain partners in the new federal states while nevertheless avoiding direct collaboration with the old nomenklatura it showed a preference for en gaging the services of people who had worked for the old "block" parties of the official East German opposition, or for the churches and their adminis trative offices, though that is not to say that these people, too, could not be compromised. the local level, the mixture has a further ingredient in the representatives of the former citizens' move ment. ^From the perspective of everyday observ ers, the western component of the elite's triangular structure appears, given its definitional power and inside information, to have taken over the position previously occupied by the Party (Berking/Neckel 1992: 166ff.) . That would also correspond with the tendencies observed in the other countries. It is already clear at this point that the transforma tion process in the new federal states needs to overcome a number of special obstacles, even though it has the benefit of a substantial lead over the other countries in terms of technocratic, ad ministrative and political knowledge, and of course is being implemented with abundant finan cial support. On the meaning level, the process would appear to be characterized by a collective experience described by Alfred Schütz in his study on strangers (Schütz 1971: 59ff.) : because the at tempt is being made to integrate the two parts of the country on the basis of mutual prior knowledge which has not been mediated by concrete interac tion, the differences between them are being brought out more clearly than ever.4 4 45 * * Discovering this "otherness", which was also felt to be one of inferiority, the former citizens of the GDR thus also discovered a GDR identity of their own which they had not felt before reunification, and which had not previously been filled out with any socially (rather than politically) accepted substance institu tionalized on a symbolic level. This is an empty space for which, though it is already preshaped by a number of options from the outside in, the inner structure is only beginning to develop. Once again, one of the most important indicators of how that empty space is indeed being shaped is the level of acceptance for privatization and its consequences for the shaping of political plural ism. It is quite reasonable to assume that such ac ceptance is not uniform but, as in the other coun tries, differs quite substantially from one section of 44 Cf. Berking/Neckel 1991 . The local transi tional 61ite described in their case study would ap pear to be by no means unusual. According to Wielgohs/Schulz (1993: 239) , the citizens' movement is active in all urban municipalities, 74% of the district towns and 47% of the smaller towns. 45 It is no coincidence that surveys of geographical dif ferences in public attitudes in the new federal states show that scepticism of the political order of former West Germany is at its highest among inhabitants of the region which used to lie on the western border of the old GDR -cf. Liebig 1993.
the public to another. Dwindling confidence in the market economy and the efforts now being made by local interest groups and authorities to preserve the old industrial infrastructure for the sake of similarly preserving jobs also give a clear indication. 46 Huinink and Mayer (1993: 166ff.) point out the likelihood of a "chain of lost genera tions" in the new federal states, deprived by the political transition and privatization process of the opportunity to become newly integrated, and partly also of the chance of upward social mobili ty. Given that the public's means of articulating it self using the codes and channels now provided by the west, though theoretically many and varied, are in fact now more constrained if anything be cause of the insecurity that variety itself has creat ed, and given also that interests are not being ar ticulated politically by any autonomously crystal lized 61ite, we have to try to identify the latent scenarios for the formation of a new identity. Such scenarios are only conceivable as a continuation and adaptation of the action orientations which predominated under real socialism. Analyses of eastern German lifestyles and consciousness have particularly highlighted the petty bourgeois char acter which was conserved and generalized in the GDR (Woderich 1991 (Woderich & 1992 . If this is so, we have a situation in which the exclusion and inclu sion effects of moral respect or disdain typified by the dual (in-group/out-group) morality existing in the real socialist setting was amplified still more by the petty bourgeois tendency to adopt a highly sensitive moral posture towards social extremes and deviant behaviour.47 These orientation pat terns shaping the societal structure under real so cialism are reported to have been particularly pro nounced in the GDR because of its greater isola tion both from the outside world and within its own society (Woderich 1992) . Against this back ground, it is not only possible to conceive of a "normal" course of developments as posited by the theory of "institutional modernization" but 46 For a representative account, see Berking/Neckel 1992, pp. 160f . According to opinion polls carried out by the Allensbach institute, acceptance of the market economy in the former GDR fell from 77% in 1990 to 35% in 1993. Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine 9.9.92, p. 5 and 16.12.93, p. 5. 47 This structure of the petty bourgeois mentality has already been identified by Geiger (1987: 85ff. & 108 ff.) and Lipsett (1992: 136 ff.) in their enquiries into the affinity between the petty bourgeoisie and Nazism. On post-war manifestations of this struc ture, cf., e.g., Jung 1982 and Eder 1989. also of certain other scenarios for filling the "empty space" of collective identity: a) The expected protest attitudes in the east due to the perceived deprivation of social status are not articulated and communicated by political elites and institutions which can be regarded as autono mous. The autonomy of trade unions which does still go some way in this direction is considerably restrained by economic pressure to maintain the east-west wage differential. To that must be added the fact that "democracy" has a relatively low pri ority as an object of identification compared to economic stability.48 An objective chance therefore exists that, here too, means of articulation may be sought which lie outside the established spectrum of politics. That is to say that the field is open, in structural terms, for populist alternatives on the Left or Right, as has been seen in the other coun tries under review. For one thing, the successor or ganization to the old ruling party is now establish ing a position as an advocate of the people's inter ests in the former GDR which is independent of the west; 31% of those people, incidentally, would welcome a return to socialism under certain cir cumstances.49 On the other hand, another element of the semantic horizon of new-found freedom is the rejection of anti-fascism which belonged to the totalitarian ideological compulsions of the GDR regime. Moreover, the combination of a down graded social status and growing uncertainty on the one hand and the old, exclusive dual morality on the other reinforces the tendency for new iden tity aids to be grasped which are derived from the chance event of belonging to a particular ethnic group or particular geographic region. Thus the willingness to engage in solidarity along such lines provides an imperfect basis upon which national ism is not yet specifically (say, politically) articulat ed, but instead is manifested for the time being in blunt violence against the foreigners people feel have been forced upon them -or, to be more pre cise, against the strangers and strangeness forced upon them. An empty space delineated by such prepolitical nationalism could indeed also be filled by populism of a right-wing stripe.
b) The feeling of inferiority in the east, and of having been labelled second-class citizens, coupled with an awareness of being totally dependent on the west both economically and politically, might activate a.willingness to establish exclusive solidar ity which, despite yet also because of that depen dence, generates the demand for symbolically in stitutionalized upgrading (not merely material or formally legal improvements), as a manifestation of parity in the reunified Germany. If it proves im possible to achieve this symbolic upgrading with the aid of established political forces, there is a dis tinct possibility of alternative movements emerg ing to further that aim. Given the constellation of structural problems, this scenario might well imply the "Slovakification" of the new federal states in the long term. The above two scenarios pose a threat of destabil ization for Germany as a whole. Thus what at first sight are the advantages enjoyed by the transfor mation process in the former GDR -the extensive financial support, the opportunity to accede to a stable, well-ordered existing political structure, the availability of experienced administrative ex perts -have, during the execution of the process, actually set off a momentum of their own which is liable to undermine the stabilizing effects flowing from those advantages. The entire Federal Repub lic of Germany is thus implicated in the imponder ables of central European transition.
Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from the observa tions made in this paper when reviewing the as sumption of "ongoing modernization"? As has been shown, the ideal-typical link posited between political pluralism and the market economy is not, whatever the rhetoric may say, an automatic link as far as the central European transformation process is concerned. Enthusiasm for political pluralism is not necessarily accompanied by an acceptance of privatization; nor, conversely, does a positive atti tude to the market economy and its related con sumption patterns necessarily imply a preference for parliamentary democracy. Evidently, the cru cial issue here is not "small-scale privatization" (providing private-sector access to wholesaling and retailing, services and small or medium-sized productive enterprises): the privatization of largescale industry is where the social dynamite lies, and this is acting as a catalyst for the differing courses taken by the transformation process in the countries under review. As the case of the GDR il lustrates, even the strongest guarantors are not able to deal with the social upheavals triggered off by radical privatization without undergoing risks. It is also clear that the hesitancy to take radical steps in this direction currently evident in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary is not without good reason, and cannot be attributed solely to the intrigues hatched by those belonging to the old structures. The danger is all too real that the bursts of anomie now triggered off could inten sify the polarization and radicalization of society. If, in the light of the background situation de scribed here, we assess the chances of the modern ization mechanisms postulated at the outset truly functioning in accordance with the theory, it is clear that it would still be premature to say quite unequivocally how those mechanisms will operate. On the normative level, social inclusion is counter acted by strong social or also ethnic exclusive ten dencies which can be traced back to the dual mo rality operating under real socialism. The same tendency also has a counteractive effect against value generalization. Meanwhile, the differentia tion of economic, political and social logics of ac tion within the structure of everyday expectations has so far been thwarted by the perception inherit ed from real socialism that all economic, political and social events are consequences of the actions taken by political Elites, whose ultimate aims are self-preservation and self-enrichment. Likewise, the structural differentiation of social positions and new initial opportunities has not even come close to generating adaptive upgrading across the board. Rather, the trends now suggesting them selves point towards real exclusion -not solely nor mative exclusion -of the social strata whose out put is low, as a result of the new mechanisms for upward social mobility created by privatization. Thus it is quite likely that the development curve of the transformation process could have a differ ent shape from that suggested by a globally applied theory of institutional modernization. Moreover, even if developments are optimum under the terms of the theory, we still should not expect the interaction between meaning-worlds derived from the real socialist period and western-style institu tions to produce post-socialist societies which are pure copies of their western models. Of course, that does not mean to say that all research on mod ernization should be dismissed. Sociological theo ry, including modernization theory, has enough ap proaches on offer which can indeed provide ade quate access to the transformation process now taking place in the post-socialist countries. But as the differentiated view developed in this paper shows us, the road ahead does not lead dead straight towards "civil society": it also has many distracting forks and turn-offs, some of which may simply be detours, but others of which can surely prove to be wrong-turnings.
